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Baird: Remedies By Judicial Review of Agency Action in Minnesota

REMEDIES BY JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION
IN MINNESOTA
by DUNCAN H. BAmDt
In 1962, Mr. Baird authored a law review article entitled Judicial Review of Administrative Procedures in Minnesota. In that
Article, special emphasis was given to the use of extraordinary
remedies to obtain judicial review of administrative action.
Since 1962, several developments have occurred which make
timely a reevaluation of the remedies available to obtainjudicial review. Three significant developments are the reinstatement of the mandamus remedy, the increased use of declaratory
judgment actions, and the enactment of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. In the following Article, Mr. Baird reevaluates the remedies by which judicial review of administrative actions can be obtained in Minnesota: the extraordinary
remedies of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto; the equitable remedies of injunction and declaratory
judgment; and the statutory remedies included in special statutes governing particularagencies as well as those included in
the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act.
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INTRODUCTION

The subject of judicial control or review of administrative action in Minnesota has been extensively treated in the past,' but
since the early sixties the topic has been given only short or narrowly topical attention.' In the period of almost a decade and onehalf since the last extensive review there have been several developments which taken together make a new examination of the
entire topic appropriate. Among the things which have occurred
and which dictate such a conclusion are the following: the adoption in 1963 by the Minnesota Legislature of provisions for judicial review under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act
(MAPA) ;3 the dethronement of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto;4 the further multiplication of administrative bodies at the
state, regional, county, and local levels; and the beginnings of
substantial misgivings on the part of the public and the courts
concerning the exercise of power by administrative agencies.
At the outset the statement must be made that what follows
in this Article is somewhat in the nature of a "no progress" report;
and the lack of any substantial changes in the forms of judicial
review of administrative action may be taken, depending on one's
point of view, as either evidence of pervasive satisfaction with the
workings of the present structure or as arising from lack of momentum for helpful change. Because a clearer insight into the
whole problem could be obtained only by an extended empirical
study of cases decided in the district courts and not appealed, and
because such a study is beyond the resources available, we are left
to draw the conclusions from the material at hand. This Article
1. See Baird, JudicialReview of Administrative Procedures in Minnesota, 46 MINN. L.
REV. 451 (1962); Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means of the ExtraordinaryRemedies in Minnesota (pts. 1-4), 33 MINN. L. REv.
569, 685 (1949), 36 MINN. L. Rxv. 435 (1952), 37 MINN. L. Rlv. 1 (1952).
2. See, e.g., Triplett & Nobles, Rule-Making Under Minnesota'sAdministrative Procedure Act: 1975 Amendments, 43 HENNaPiN LAw. 14 (July-Aug. 1975); Note, Appealable
Orders, Prohibition,and Mandamus in Minnesota, 51 MINN. L. REv. 115 (1967).
3. Act of May 22, 1963, ch. 809, 1963 Minn. Laws 1430.
4. Quo warranto is abolished under the Minnesota rules. MINN. R. Civ. P. 81.01(2).
However, its statutory authorization remains valid. See note 90 infra and accompanying
text.
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will examine one aspect of the judicial review process: remedies
by which judicial review is obtained in Minnesota.
A number of basic principles, however, involve prerequisites to
all types of judicial review of administrative agency action.5
These jurisdictional principles deal with the problems of when,
and to whom, judicial review is available. Discussed below is an
overview of these principles, followed by an examination of the
various judicial remedies available in Minnesota for review of
administrative action.

II.

PREREQUISITES TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES

A.

Standing

Standing is the doctrine that determines who may challenge an
administrative decision. It concerns the nature of the plaintiff's
injury in relation to the administrative action. For a particular
plaintiff to have standing, courts usually require that the plaintiff
have a sufficient stake in the outcome to assure the competent
presentation of issues to the court.'
The concept of standing presently is being completely revised,
possibly as a judicial response to widespread demand for greater
citizen participation in the governmental process of decisionmaking? Reinforcing the judicial trend toward a more expansive definition of standing are modern appeals statutes which likewise
have broadened the concept of standing.8
Minnesota also has liberalized the standing requirements. In
Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Minnesota Board of Pharmacy,9 two
5. For an in-depth discussion of prerequisites to judicial review, see Fuchs,
Prerequisitesto JudicialReview of Administrative Agency Action, 51 IND. L.J. 817 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Twin Ports Convalescent, Inc. v. Minnesota State Bd. of Health,
Minn...
-,
257 N.W.2d 343, 346 (1977); Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. City of
Brainerd, Minn. - .
241 N.W.2d 624, 628, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803
(1976). In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) the apparent argument of the
Sierra Club was that its long record of support for environmental protection was earnest
enough to assure an adequately adverse presentation of issues. Id. at 736. A divided Court
rejected this claim to standing. Id. at 736-41.
7. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 683-90 (1973) (unincorporated
association formed by law students to enhance environmental quality held to have standing to challenge an ICC freight rate increase). See generally PanelII: Standing, Participation and Who Pays?, 26 AD. L. Rxv. 423 (1974).
8.For example, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) (emphasis added) provides in part: "A person
...adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial relief thereof." The Minnesota statute is similar. See MNN.
STAT. § 15.0424(1) (1976) (persons "aggrieved" by a final agency decision in a contested
case may seek judicial review).
9. 301 Minn. 28, 221 N.W.2d 162 (1974).
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nonprofit consumer advocate corporations were permitted to intervene in a suit challenging a rule of the Minnesota State Board
of Pharmacy that prohibited the advertisement of prescription
drug prices. In finding the consumer corporations to be proper
parties acting on behalf of the drug-purchasing public, the court
applied a requirement of "injury in fact"' 0 and thereby recognized
that consumers may have standing." Although some courts have
also required that the alleged injury be "arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated"' 2 by the agency, the
court in Snyder's Drug Stores made no mention of it."
The requirement of injury in fact is clearly consistent with the
provisions of MAPA relating to judicial review of contested cases.
Minnesota Statutes section 15.0424(1) provides that any person
"aggrieved" may seek judicial review; 4 this broad language is
similar to the broad requirement of injury in fact. With regard to
judicial review of rulemaking, however, the Minnesota court's
requirement of injury in fact seems broader than the statutory
language which allows review only if the petitioner's "legal rights
or privileges" have been threatened or impaired. 5 In fact, because
anyone "affected" by a proposed regulation is entitled to participate in the rulemaking procedure of an agency, 6 it appears from
the court's decision in Snyder's Drug Stores that the test applied
to persons seeking judicial review of rules already in existence will
be the same as the test for persons seeking participation in the
initial rulemaking procedure. This conclusion is reinforced by a
1976 decision, Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Minnesota Department of Labor & Industry,7 where the Minnesota
10. Id. at 32, 221 N.W.2d at 165.
11. See id. at 32-36, 221 N.W.2d at 165-67.
12. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970); Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 523 F.2d 730, 731-32 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Clinton
Community Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Md. Medical Center, 510 F.2d 1037, 1038 (4th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1048 (1975). But see, e.g., Park View Heights Corp.
v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1212 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1972) (requiring only injury in
fact); Constructores Civiles de Centroamerica v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1188 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (discussing the criticisms of the zone test). See generally K. DAvis, ADMnTriTVE
LAw OF Ta SEVENTS § 22.02-11 (1976) (discussing the merits of the zone test).
13. But see Twin Ports Convalescent, Inc. v. Minnesota State Bd. of Health,
Minn.
, -,
257 N.W.2d 343, 346 (1977) (applying zone test).
14. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424(1) (1976).
15. Id. § 15.0416. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has rejected prior tests of
standing which require interference with a legal right; the rationale is that the "legal
right" test is too narrow, going to the merits of the case rather than standing. Association
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
16. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
17.
- Minn. -,
249 N.W.2d 437 (1976).
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court reversed a lower court determination that MPIRG, a public
interest organization, was entitled under the applicable statute"
to participate as an "interested person" in rulemaking procedure
but not entitled to standing and judicial review of the rulemaking
procedure. The Minnesota Supreme Court said:"
It is difficult to reconcile the trial court's separate determination (1) that MPIRG is an "interested person" and thus entitled
to request a hearing under the Minnesota Act, but (2) that it
does not have standing to bring a judicial action challenging the
validity of standards adopted after a denial of such requested
hearing. A right to demand a hearing is for all practical purposes
nonexistent if its conceded violation cannot be vindicated
through judicial action. By the same token, the right to demand
a hearing is meaningless if the party making such demand may
not present the relevant data and evidence in its possession at
such hearing.
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that MPIRG was entitled to participation in the rulemaking procedure and judicial
review of the rulemaking procedure. The reasoning of the court,
although directed at rulemaking under the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act, seems equally applicable to rulemaking under MAPA.
B.

Ripeness and Exhaustion

Two doctrines concerning prerequisites to judicial review of
agency action involve the timing of judicial review. One doctrine
is ripeness. It is axiomatic that judicial review will be permitted
States
only when the issues are clear and concrete.20 The United
2
Supreme Court has characterized ripeness as follows: '

[Ilts basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance
of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to
protect the agencies from judicial interference until an adminis18. The rulemaking occurred under the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health
Act, which allows "interested persons" to comment on proposed rules and request a public
hearing on any objections. See MINN. STAT. § 182.655(2) (1976).
19.
-. Minn. at -, 249 N.W.2d at 440.
20. See Fuchs, supra note 5, at 819. See generally K. DAvIS, supra note 12, § 21.06.
21. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967); accord, e.g., A.O. Smith
Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 521 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting Abbott Laboratories);Continental
Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (on rehearing) (quoting Abbott
Laboratories).
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trative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties.
In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner21 the Court adopted a twopronged test: (1) fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2)
direct and immediate hardship from the agency action.23 Upon
satisfaction of both criteria, judicial review is proper. 2 Issues are
fit for judicial decision when they are legal, rather than factual,
and are a result of final agency action. 5 Hardship, on the other
hand, is present if the plaintiff suffers immediate and substantial
injury from an immediate economic burden, imminent threat of
criminal or civil penalties, irreparable injury to business reputation, and other matters which have a "direct effect on the dayto-day business" of the plaintiff."
The second of the timing doctrines is the requirement that
plaintiffs exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. Its purpose is to prevent premature interruptions of the administrative process and thus enable the agency to
carry out its statutory powers and duties." The doctrine bears a
close resemblance to, or tends to shade into, the doctrine of ripeness. In either case the central question is whether it is proper for
the court, at a particular point in time, to enter into the adjudication process. However, the doctrine requiring the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies concerns the narrow question
of whether the controversy must be treated further in the administrative process rather than in the courts, whereas ripeness concerns the existence of a judicially cognizable controversy at a
given time."2
The requirement of exhausting administrative remedies is
statutory under MAPA with respect to appeals in contested
22. 387 U.S. 136 (1967), noted in, e.g., 52 MINN. L. Rzv. 872 (1968).
23. 387 U.S. at 149.
24. See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162 (1967); Booker Custom
Packing Co. v. McLain, 427 F. Supp. 325, 327 (N.D. Tex. 1977); American Medical Ass'n
v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 515, 521-22 (D. Ill. 1975), affd, 522 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975).
25. E.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-52 (1967); A.O. Smith Corp. v.
FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 521 (3d Cir. 1976).
26. E.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152-53 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods
Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 171-74 (1967); A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 524 (3d Cir.
1976).
27. E.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969); Fuchs, supranote 5, at
860.
28. E.g., K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 21.01, at 116 (1958).
29. MiN. STAT. § 15.0424(1) (1976) provides that judicial review is available for a "final
decision" in a contested case. "Final decision" does not include a tentative agency deci-
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cases." Elsewhere it is a judicial rule.30 The United States Supreme Court has found finality in this context when 3'
the process of administrative decisionmaking has reached a
stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process
of adjudication and . . . [the] rights or obligations have been

determined or legal consequences will flow from the agency action.
Courts frequently proclaim their adherence to the principle

and, as Professor Davis points out, 3 just as frequently ignore it.

Thus courts often will not invoke the exhaustion requirement if
the agency's jurisdiction is questioned,33 exhaustion would be futile,3' administrative remedies are inadequate or nonexistent,35 or
exhaustion would subject the plaintiff to irreparable harm.4 In
addition, in cases arising under the Civil Rights Act, exhaustion
37
of administrative remedies usually is not required.
sion unless "it has become the decision of the agency either by express approval or by the
failure of an aggrieved person to file exceptions thereto within a prescribed time under
the agency's rules." Id. Final agency action and its attendant opportunity for judicial
review, when based on the plaintiff's failure to file timely exceptions under the agency's
rules, arguably is an exception to exhaustion rather than a means of exhaustion. See Getts,
JudicialReview: The ProceduralMechanics, in MINNESOTA CONTINUINO LEoAL EDUCATION,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS IN MINNESOTA: FROM AGENCY HEARING TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW 132 (1976).
30. See, e.g., State v. United States Steel Corp., 307 Minn. 374, 379-81, 240 N.W.2d
316, 319-20 (1976); State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Olson, 295 Minn. 379, 387, 206

N.W.2d 12, 17 (1973); Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1, 4-7, 60 N.W.2d 18, 20-21 (1953),
writ of prohibition quashed sub nom. Ramberg v. District Court, 241 Minn. 194, 62
N.W.2d 809 (1954), rev'd on second appeal on other grounds, 245 Minn. 474, 73 N.W.2d
195 (1955).

31. Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Roderiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U.S. 62, 71 (1970).
32. K. DAvIS, supra note 12, § 20.01, at 466.
33. See, e.g., Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954); Skinner & Eddy
Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1919); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,
211 U.S. 210, 231 (1908). But see, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S.
41, 50-51 (1938). See generally Fuchs, supra note 5, at 892-96.
34. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
841 (1970); Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FTC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1081 (C.D.
Cal. 1976).

35. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405-07 (1970); McNeese v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F.2d 249, 251-53 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977).
36. See, e.g., Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1125 n.10 (10th Cir. 1973) (dictum); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 469 F.2d 1116, 1118 (2d Cir. 1972); Lyons v. Weinberger,
376 F. Supp. 248, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). This is especially true if the irreparable harm
involves deprivation of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd.,
372 F.2d 8 17p 820 (2d Cir. 1967).
37. See, e.g., McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167Mitchell
(1961);Hamline
Fuchs, Open
supraAccess,
note 5,1978
at 886-92. See generally Comment, Exhaustion of State
Published by
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The Minnesota case law shows a similar trend. Although exhaustion has been held to be the general rule,3" the futility exception seems firmly established. 3' In State Board of Medical Examiners v. Olson, 0 the state medical board brought an action against
a chiropractor to obtain a declaratory judgment that his use of
certain devices constituted illegal practice of medicine. The lower
court dismissed for lack of pursuit of administrative remedies
through the chiropractic board. The supreme court reversed, stat41
ing:
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
have some limitations. Where it would be futile to seek redress
from an administrative body, the courts are available to a party
to seek redress. .

.

. Here, it would obviously have been fruit-

less to proceed before the Chiropractic Board. That is evident
in the answer interposed in this action, where the board as well
as Olson admit possession and use of the devices involved but
claim a chiropractor has a right to use them in his practice ...
[U]nder the facts in this case it would be useless to ask it [the
Chiropractic Board] to determine whether the actions of the
chiropractor constitute the practice of medicine.
The basic question in Olson appears to be one of law-interpretation of what constitutes medical practice. In such a situation a court may be emboldened to intervene, in contrast to a
situation where a case turns upon fact questions or questions of
mixed law and fact involving a high degree of administrative
expertise.
Likewise, a showing that exhaustion would cause imminent
and irreparable harm from action constitutionally impermissible
or beyond the agency's jurisdiction usually will enable plaintiffs
to bypass the administrative process in Minnesota. 4 The MinneAdministrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. Cm. L. REV. 537 (1974).
38. See, e.g., Garavalia v. City of Stillwater, 283 Minn. 335, 347, 168 N.W.2d 336, 345
(1969) (exhaustion usually required before injunctive relief is available); State ex rel.
Sheehan v. District Court, 253 Minn. 462, 466-67, 93 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (1958) (per curiam)
(same), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 909 (1959).
39. See State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Olson, 295 Minn. 379, 387, 206 N.W.2d 12,
17 (1973); Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 394-95, 71 N.W.2d 869, 884 (1955).
40. 295 Minn. 379, 206 N.W.2d 12 (1973).
41. Id. at 387, 206 N.W.2d at 17.
42. See, e.g., Garavalia v. City of Stillwater, 283 Minn. 335, 347, 168 N.W.2d 336, 345
(1969); State ex rel. Turnbladh v. District Court, 259 Minn. 228, 238-40, 107 N.W.2d 307,
314-15 (1960); State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court, 253 Minn. 462, 466-67, 93 N.W.2d
1, 4-5 (1958) (per curiam); Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1, 4-7, 60 N.W.2d 18, 20-21
(1953), writ of prohibition quashed sub nom. Ramberg v. District Court, 241 Minn. 194,
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sota court has also recognized, at least implicitly, that exhaustion
is unnecessary when the administrative remedies are inadequate
or nonexistent 3 and when an agency is acting in violation of state
statute."
C.

Primary Jurisdiction

Although related to exhaustion and ripeness, primary jurisdiction is concerned not with the timing of judicial review but rather
the question of who should deal initially with the case: the administrative agency or the court? 45 The purpose of the doctrine is
twofold. First, it utilizes the expertise of agencies and, second, it
creates uniformity in the agency's regulation as well as the deci4
sionmaking process.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized the distinction
between primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies and has suggested that judicial relief raises a question
of primary jurisdiction rather than exhaustion if sought at a time
before any administrative action has occurred. 7 The Minnesota
court has also held that when the administrative agency itself is
seeking to invoke judicial proceedings, questions of primary jurisdiction need not be considered and resort may be made initially
8
to the court.

Ill.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE REMEDIES IN JuDiciLL REVIEW

The available judicial instruments for control of administrative
action can be collected under three headings: the extraordinary
62 N.W.2d 809 (1954), rev 'don second appealon othergrounds, 245 Minn. 474, 73 N.W.2d
195 (1955).
245 N.W.2d 460 (1976) (per
Minn. -,
43. See McKee v. County of Ramsey, curiam); Knutson Hotel Corp. v. City of Moorhead, 250 Minn. 392, 397-98, 84 N.W.2d
626, 630 (1957).
44. See Minneapolis Fed. of Teachers, Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 46, 144
N.W.2d 789 (labor conciliator enjoined from acting, without exhaustion, pending judicial

determination of the constitutionality of the statute authorizing the conciliator's actions),
rev'd on second appeal on other grounds, 275 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966).
45. K. DAVIS, supra note 12, § 19.01, at 435.
46. See, e.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952) (expertise and flexible procedure of administrative agencies, utilized through primary jurisdiction, promote uniformity and consistency in regulation). See generally Travis, Primary
Jurisdiction:A General Theory and Its Application to the Securities Exchange Act, 63
CALIF. L. REv. 926 (1975).
47. See State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minnesota, 236 Minn. 452, 456-58, 54
N.W.2d 122, 126 (1952).
Minn ....
240 N.W.2d 316, 31948. See State v. United States Steel Corp., 20 (1976) (judicial relief sought by Minnesota Pollution Control Agency).
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remedies, equitable remedies, and special statutory proceedings.
Included within the extraordinary remedies are certiorari and the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto. The equitable
remedies include injunction and, perhaps rather arbitrarily, the
statutory remedy of the declaratory judgment. The special statutory proceedings include certain provisions of MAPA and a number of statutory provisions incorporated in the statutes that prescribe the procedures for particular administrative agencies.
Many of these statutes for particular agencies bear a strong family resemblance, and in fact many have identical provisions. In
general, they call for a limited review of the certiorari type.
It is obvious that some of these remedies and proceedings may
be used in conjunction or alternatively. Yet some respond better
than others to the various kinds of administrative actions and
situations. Thus a remedy suitable to review of a quasi-judicial
decision may not be appropriate to deal with a troublesome rule
promulgated by an agency.
With the customary caution that it is not intended as anything
more than a helpful guide and not an infallible oracle, the following table briefly outlines the system.

Remedy
Extraordinary

certiorari

Reviewing Court:
Authorizing Minnesota Statute or
Rule of Court

district court:
MINN. STAT.

Applies to
Review of:
quasi-judicial action

§§

484.03, 606.01

supreme court:
MINN. STAT. §§ 480.04, 606.01
MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 115

mandamus

district court:
MINN. STAT.

§§

484.03, 586.01-.12

§§

480.04, 586.01-.12

supreme court:
MINN. STAT.

MINN. R. CIv. APP. P. 120

prohibition

district court:
not available
supreme court:
MINN. STAT. § 480.04
MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 120

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/1
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validity of quasijudicial proceedings

district court:
probably not available
supreme court:
MINN. STAT. § 480.04

Equitable
injunction

district court:
MINN. STAT. § 484.03
MINN. R. Civ. P. 65
supreme court:
MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 103(b)
(appellate review of district
court's decision)

declaratory
judgment

district court:
MINN. STAT. §§ 15.0416, 555.01-.16

includes mandatory
injunction; used generally to direct administrative action
and in connection
with or as an alternative to declaratory judgment, mandamus, or quo warranto
agency rules; actual
or threatened action
by an agency

supreme court:
MINN. STAT. § 555.07 (appellate
review of district court's
decision)
Statutory

MAPA

district court:
MINN. STAT. §§ 15.0416-.0426

supreme court:
MINN. STAT. § 15.0426

rulemaking and
"contested cases" of
state agencies

(appellate

review of district court's
decision)

special statutes for
particular
agencies

usually similar to MAPA

usually certioraritype of review

A study of this table suggests the further question: What is the
present status and application of each remedy? The following
portion of this Article seeks to answer this question.
IV.

THE EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES

The extraordinary remedies are by far more difficult to use
than equitable and statutory remedies. The greatest problem encountered in their use is the determination of when they are available. Certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and quo warranto involve technical distinctions and requirements. Moreover, courts
are hesitant to apply them, particularly the more drastic ones, if
there appears to be another adequate remedy or if there is no
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immediate threat of irreparable damage. Finally, used individually they may not be complete; therefore, they must sometimes
be joined to provide a suitable form of relief. For purposes of this
Article, however, each will be discussed separately.
A.

Certiorari

The writ of certiorari, which is discretionary,' 9 is appropriate to
order up from some judicial or quasi-judicial body the record of
that body's proceedings in order that it may be examined for a
legal infirmity. 0 From this it follows that the outreach of certiorari is confined to those matters of law which can be determined
by an examination of the record, 5 including defects in jurisdiction;52 defective procedures, including whatever procedural safeguards are mandated by federal and state constitutions; 5 insufficient factual basis, as a matter of law, for fact findings;5 and
conclusions of law unjustified by the factual conclusions or otherwise improper. 55
Review of quasi-judicial agency action has traditionally been
accomplished by certiorari, whereas review of agency ministerial
or rulemaking action is usually accomplished by other remedies. 5
The continued viability of the distinction between quasi-judicial
action on the one hand and ministerial or rulemaking action on
the other can be questioned, however, for at least two reasons.
49. E.g., Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 481, 124 N.W.2d 328, 349
(1963); Libby v. Town of West St. Paul, 14 Minn. 248, 249 (Gil. 181, 182) (1869).
50. E.g., Mahnerd v. Canfield, 297 Minn. 148, 152, 211 N.W.2d 177, 179-80 (1973);
Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 488, 124 N.W.2d 328, 351 (1963); State
ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Serv. Bd., 226 Minn. 240, 248-49, 32 N.W.2d 574, 580 (1948).
51. E.g., Hamlin v. Coolerator Co., 227 Minn. 437, 449, 35 N.W.2d 616, 622 (1949);
State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council, 53 Minn. 238, 242, 55 N.W. 118, 119 (1893).
52. E.g., Bozied v. Edgerton, 239 Minn. 227, 230, 58 N.W.2d 313, 315 (1953); State ex
rel. Dybdal v. State Sec. Comm'n, 145 Minn. 221, 225, 176 N.W. 759, 761 (1920).
53. E.g., Keller v. Independent School Dist. No. 742, 302 Minn. 324, 328, 224 N.W.2d
749, 752 (1974); State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 571, 7 N.W.2d 544,
556 (1942), overruled in part on other grounds in Foesch v. Independent School Dist. No.
646, 300 Minn. 478, 223 N.W.2d 371 (1974).
54. E.g., Housing & Redev. Auth. v. Coleman's Serv., Inc., 281 Minn. 63, 73, 160
N.W.2d 266, 273 (1968) (evidence must be "reasonably sufficient"); Williams v. W.W.
Wallwork, Moorhead, Inc., 231 Minn. 244, 246, 42 N.W.2d 710, 711 (1950) (there must be
"sufficient competent evidence to support the findings"). The Minnesota Supreme Court
has used a variety of standards to test the sufficiency of the evidence, creating some
confusion and inconsistency. Baird, supra note 1, at 462-64.
55. E.g., Sellin v. City of Duluth, 248 Minn. 333, 339-40, 80 N.W.2d 67, 71-72 (1957);
State ex rel. Beise v. District Court, 83 Minn. 464, 466, 86 N.W. 455, 456 (1901).
56. See, e.g., Mahnerd v. Canfield, 297 Minn. 148, 152-53, 211 N.W.2d 177, 179-80
(1973); State ex rel. Huntley School Dist. No. 4 v. Schweickhard, 232 Minn. 342, 344, 45
N.W.2d 657, 658 (1951).
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/1
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First, it is very difficult to distinguish quasi-judicial action from
legislative action in borderline cases. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has suggested these tests:5 7
In determining whether an agency functions in an administrative or quasi-judicial capacity, no hard-and-fast rules can be set
forth. Rather, it is necessary in each instance to examine the
nature and quality of the action taken. A frequently used test
is to see whether the function under consideration involves the
exercise of discretion and requires notice and hearing. If these
elements are present, the finding is considered a quasi-judicial
act. .

.

. We have also said that the test . . . is whether an

agency is created to represent the interests of the public or
whether it is to act only in deciding controversies between other
entities of government or individual members of the public. It
is significant, in this respect, whether the agency may act on its
own initiative or must wait for parties to appear before it.
A moment's reflection on these tests, however, will still leave
one with a feeling of some lack of guidance. For example, it is
apparent that in a number of cases of rulemaking, clearly an
administrative or legislative matter," the rule can be adopted
only as an exercise of discretion after notice and hearing.59 Furthermore, it is anomolous to contend that any agency, whatever
the kind of action taken, is not "created to represent the interests
of the public."
Secondly, it is arguable that certiorari is now available to review legislative functions of an agency. Under the rulemaking
procedures set forth in section 15.0412 of MAPA, a hearing upon
notice and a hearing record are required upon any proposed rule."
The presence of this record suggests the availability of certiorari,
especially in view of the fact that the declaratory-judgment remedy set forth in the statute apparently is not exclusive."' The real
57. Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. Governor's Certificate of Need Appeal Bd., 304
Minn. 209, 214, 230 N.W.2d 176, 179-80 (1975).
58. See, e.g., Vicker v. Starkey, 265 Minn. 464, 469, 122 N.W.2d 169, 173 (1963); Lee
v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 110-15, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538-39 (1949).
59. MINN. STAT. § 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1977).
60. Id. § 15.0412(4), (6).

61. MINN. STAT, § 15.0416 (1976) provides that the "validity of any rule may be determined upon the petition for a declaratory judgment .... " Although it is arguable that
this specific provision for declaratory judgment is separate from the general declaratoryjudgment remedy set forth in MINN. STAT. ch. 555 (1976), it is more likely that section
15.0416 merely authorizes the use of the declaratory-judgment remedy set forth in chapter
555. Therefore, section 15.0416 would not provide the exclusive remedy because the remedy under chapter 555 is "an alternative remedy." Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't
Relief Ass'n, 218 Minn. 27, 30, 15 N.W.2d 122, 124 (1944) (quoting Borchard, The Uniform
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issue here is the scope of the two remedies, in which it may well
be that the declaratory judgment action permits a wider scope of
review because of the nature of the action as a de novo proceeding.62
B.

Mandamus

Mandamus is a remedy designed to compel performance of a
duty by a government official.63 Mandamus has always been considered to be one of the extraordinary writs having particular
efficacy because its thrust is somewhat more drastic than the
remedy available under certiorari. The courts have always classified it as a legal remedy.6 4 However, they have nevertheless considered it to be an equitable remedy in its essential nature and
therefore equitable principles are used in its application. 5 The
principle of equity which places the greatest restriction on its use
is the ancient requirement of no other adequate legal remedy."
In addition, there may be attached a rather vague requirement
that mandamus is available only where it is a complete remedy
under the circumstances of the case.67
DeclaratoryJudgments Act, 18 MINN. L. Rlv. 239, 242 (1934)). See also Kudak, Judicial
Review: ConstitutionalObjections, ProceduralShortcomings, Errors of Law, and Miscellaneous Considerations,in MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW PROCESS IN MINNESOTA: FROM AGENCY HEARING TO JUDICIAL REvIEw 163 (1976)
("Review of rule making pursuant to Minn. Stats. § 15.0416 is by declaratory judgment.
Arguably, new evidence may be admitted under the Declaratory Judgment Act (Minn.
Stats. §555).").
62. For example, the court stated in Town of Stillwater v. Minnesota Mun. Comm'n,
300 Minn. 211, 217, 219 N.W.2d 82, 86 (1974):
In such cases [where an annexation ordinance is challenged by means of a
declaratory judgment action], the party challenging the ordinance is entitled
to a trial de novo on the merits of the proposed annexation, and the district court
from which declaratory relief is sought is empowered to act as a finder of fact
in determining the merits.
63. E.g., Marine v. Whipple, 259 Minn. 18, 21, 104 N.W.2d 657, 659 (1960); State ex
rel. Longman v. Kachelmacher, 255 Minn. 255, 258, 96 N.W.2d 542, 545 (1959); State ex
rel. Brenner v. Hodapp, 234 Minn. 365, 369-70, 48 N.W.2d 519, 522 (1951).
64. See, e.g., Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 265,
87 N.W.2d 671, 679-80 (1958); State ex rel. Barnes v. Tauer, 178 Minn. 484, 487, 227 N.W.
499, 500 (1929).
65. See, e.g., Alevizos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 494, 216
N.W.2d 651, 665 (1974) (mandamus is an equitable remedy and equitable defenses are
available); State ex rel. Brenner v. Hodapp, 234 Minn. 365, 368, 48 N.W.2d 519, 521 (1951)
(mandamus available in sound discretion of the court and upon equitable principles).
66. E.g., Victor Co. v. State, 290 Minn. 40, 45, 186 N.W.2d 168, 172 (1971) (there cannot
be another adequate remedy "at law"); Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of
Detroit Lakes, 221 Minn. 55, 59, 21 N.W.2d 203, 206 (1945) (there cannot be another
"plain, speedy, and adequate" remedy).
67. In Curry v. Young, 285 Minn. 387, 173 N.W.2d 410 (1969) the Minnesota court
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Some practical question about the absolute necessity for the
continued use of mandamus is raised by the fact that for almost
ten years (1959 to 1968) the remedy was abolished at least procedurally, only to be reinstated in 1968.8 In the interim period the
function of mandamus appears to have been successfully carried
out principally by mandatory injunction or possibly other extraordinary or statutory remedies."9 At least one case decided
before the interim suggests that there is a distinction between
mandamus and mandatory injunction in that mandamus is a
positive direction to do something, whereas mandatory injunction
is a negative order to refrain from doing something.70 A better
view would seem to be that this is a distinction without a difference, and the remedy of injunction could easily be used to order
the same action as mandamus itself. This may, in fact, be the
present view of the Minnesota Supreme Court, which stated in
Curry v. Young:7 "Whether we call the proceeding mandamus or
a mandatory injunction has little significance."
It is clear that mandamus can be used for the sole purpose of
requiring performance of an unequivocal legal duty, which is interpreted to mean that it cannot be used to direct the judgment
of an administrative body in any instance where discretion is
involved." However, mandamus can be used in the situation
stated that "about the only rule we can glean from our cases is that mandamus ordinarily
will not lie to control the exercise of discretion by administrative agencies, but it will lie
if there is no other adequate and complete remedy." Id. at 395, 173 N.W.2d at 414
(emphasis added). However, the court seemed to equate "complete" with "adequate"
because it went on to say: "We think that is the situation here. A review by certiorari
might lead to a decision that the city was wrong, but it would not provide the relief
plaintiffs seek." Id.
68. Compare Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(2), 254 Minn. app. 77 (1959) with Minn. R. Civ.
P. 81.01(2), 278 Minn. app. 85 (1968).
69. See Scoles v. Hurd, 275 Minn. 569, 570, 148 N.W.2d 164, 165 (1967) (per curiam)
(dictum) ("While Rule 81, Rules of Civil Procedure, abolishes the writ of mandamus, the
relief formerly secured through this writ is obtainable still in a proper case."); State ex
rel. Stubben v. Board of County Comm'rs, 273 Minn. 361, 363-67, 141 N.W.2d 499, 50104 (1966) (action similar to mandatory injunction); Marine v. Whipple, 259 Minn. 18,104
N.W.2d 657 (1960) (writ of prohibition sought in lieu of mandamus).
70. In State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minnesota, 236 Minn. 452, 54 N.W.2d 122
(1952) the Minnesota court distinguished mandamus from injunction by stating:
"Whether mandamus or injunction is the proper remedy usually depends on whether the
party demanding relief seeks to compel the board to do something it is required to do by
law or to prevent it from doing something which is prohibited by law." Id. at 462, 54
N.W.2d at 129.
71. 285 Minn. 387, 393-94, 173 N.W.2d 410, 413 (1969). The court reiterated the point
later: "Whether we call it mandamus or mandatory injunction does not seem too important if we reach the merits of the dispute." Id. at 394-95, 173 N.W.2d at 414.
72. E.g., State ex rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn. 514, 518, 75 N.W.2d
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where the action of an administrative body is so arbitrary, whimsical, capricious, and unreasonable that the result in a legal sense
amounts to no action at all or a total miscarriage.7 3 As a matter
of fact, most of the mandamus cases fall into this category. Thus
the reviewing court's essential task is to determine whether, upon
all the facts surrounding the matter, the agency acted arbitrarily,
capriciously, and unreasonably. It requires no profound study of
the law to see that in many instances the determination of arbitrariness or capriciousness is a rather difficult matter, and will
perforce depend upon a certain amount of judicial judgment.
This is to say that each case will depend upon its own facts to a
great extent.
In attempts to characterize the kind of administrative action
to which mandamus applies, the courts uniformly declare that it
must be administrative action which is "ministerial" or "purely
ministerial."'" Occasionally the courts have undertaken the duty
of formulating a definition of the term "ministerial."75 Generally,
however, the courts seem to treat as "ministerial" all those activities which do not involve the application of administrative discretion." This results in a circular or tautological definition: ministerial acts are those which do not involve discretion, and if acts
do not involve discretion they are ministerial and proper for review by mandamus. The real question is: when is discretion
involved? In marginal cases this is not easy to determine.
The appropriate remedy by way of mandamus is, of course, an
order remanding the matter to the administrative body directing
that body to produce a decision, and it follows from the nature
of the action as well as from the separation of powers doctrine
780, 783-84 (1956); State ex rel. Lewis v. City Council, 140 Minn. 433, 434, 168 N.W. 188,
188 (1918).
73. E.g., Curry v. Young, 285 Minn. 387, 394-95, 173 N.W.2d 410, 414 (1969); State ex
rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn. 514, 518, 75 N.W.2d 780, 783-84 (1956).
74. E.g., Electronics Unlimited, Inc. v. Village of Burnsville, 289 Minn. 118, 123, 182
N.W.2d 679, 682 (1971); Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388, 393, 122 N.W. 251, 252-53 (1909).
75. The Minnesota court has quoted with approval the following definition of
"ministerial duty" set forth in People v. May, 251 Ill. 54, 57, 95 N.E. 999, 1000 (1911):
"Official duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely
the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts." See Williamson
v. Cain,__ Minn. -..
245 N.W.2d 242, 244 (1976) (per curiam); Cook v. Trovaten, 200 Minn. 221, 224, 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937)
76. See, e.g., Bauer v. Independent School Dist. No. 656, 303 Minn. 449, 451-52, 229
N.W.2d 129, 130-31 (1975) (per curiam); Waters v. Putnam, 289 Minn. 165, 171-72, 183
N.W.2d 545, 550 (1971).
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that the court cannot direct the contents of the decision in its
particulars .

C. Prohibition
By its nature, prohibition is a remedy to which resort is seldom
made. It is used at the present time for the purpose of preventing
administrative agencies from adjudicating cases which lie outside
their competency. The traditional purpose of the writ was to enjoin a court from proceeding when for some valid reason, such as
lack of jurisdiction, it should not be permitted to continue. 8 By
analogy, the writ as a means of administrative review applies only
to quasi-judicial administrative action, not rulemaking. An additional reason for the scarce use of the writ is the fact that the
remedy in the Minnesota judicial system is available only in the
supreme court.7
Since the remedy is a drastic one of direct and abrupt interference in the judicial process, courts are reluctant to apply it and
do so only where there is no adequate remedy at law." Although
it might be argued that a somewhat lesser standard should be
applicable to the use of the writ against administrative agencies
than to its use against a court, the Minnesota cases on the point
seem to make no distinction. As an example, in State ex rel.
Adent v. Industrial Commission 8 the relator sought a writ of
prohibition to prevent the Industrial Commission from hearing a
compensation claim on the ground that the commissioner had no
jurisdiction over the relators. The court denied the application for
the writ on the ground that the jurisdictional claims could be
raised at any time on appeal; thus, no irreparable injury was
threatened even though this might require the relator to go
through the futile activities of exhausting administrative remedies.

2

It can also be inferred that the availability of statutory or

77. See, e.g., Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Detroit Lakes, 221 Minn.
55, 57-59, 21 N.W.2d 203, 205-06 (1945); State ex rel. Laurisch v. Pohl, 214 Minn. 221,
226, 8 N.W.2d 227, 231 (1943).
78. See, e.g., Griggs, Cooper & Co. v. Lauer's Inc., 264 Minn. 338, 341, 119 N.W.2d
850, 852 (1962) ("As this court has frequently stated, the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ issuing out of this court to keep inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction."). See also MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 120.01 ("Application [to the supreme court]
for a writ . . . of prohibition . . . directed to a judge or judges shall be made by petition.").
79. See MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 120.
80. E.g., Richardson v. School Bd., 297 Minn. 91, 93, 210 N.W.2d 911, 913 (1973); Feist
v. State, 290 Minn. 491, 492, 186 N.W.2d 173, 174 (1971) (per curiam).
81. 234 Minn. 567, 48 N.W.2d 42 (1951) (per curiam).
43-44.
N.W.2d
82. Id. Hamline
at 569, 48
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other means of judicial review in the regular course of the administrative proceedings is a factor which the supreme court is likely
to consider in determining whether to grant the writ.
The writ of prohibition is said to be a remedy of "appellate
prevention, not appellate correction. 8'

3

Thus, it cannot be used

to correct substantive errors of the agency; 8' rather, it is used to
correct jurisdictional defects.8 5 Moreover, it is clear that the writ
can be used both where the agency has jurisdiction but exceeds
the jurisdictional powers and where the agency has no jurisdiction
at all. 8
D. Quo Warranto
The writ of quo warranto was abolished by Rule 81.01(2) of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, effective July 1, 1959.87 Unlike the writ of mandamus, which was abolished at the same
time,88 quo warranto has never been resurrected. 8 Rule 81.01(2)
applies, of course, to procedure in the Minnesota district courts;
the Rule does not, therefore, repeal the underlying statute which
authorizes quo warranto as a remedy available in the district
courts.90 The net result of this rather anomolous situation was
clarified in Town of Burnsville v. City of Bloomington:"
Amicus curiae asserts that, since we abolished the writ of quo
warranto by an amendment to our rules of civil procedure, only
the supreme court has jurisdiction over proceedings to test the
validity of municipal annexations. .

.

.[W]e do not agree with

the contention. While the antiquated writ of quo warranto as
such is abolished, and probably with it some of its former technical limitation, the remedies formerly afforded by the writ are
expressly retained and may be obtained by any other available
appropriate action. .

.

.It is abundantly clear that it is only the

83. In re Giblin, 304 Minn. 510, 516 n.4, 232 N.W.2d 214, 218 n.4 (1975).
84. See, e.g., In re Parks, 262 Minn. 319, 323, 114 N.W.2d 667, 669-70 (1962); Bellows
v. Ericson, 233 Minn. 320, 325, 46 N.W.2d 654, 658 (1951).
85. In re Giblin, 304 Minn. 510, 515-16, 232 N.W.2d 214, 218 (1975); Ginsberg v. William, 270 Minn. 474, 479-80, 135 N.W.2d 213, 218 (1965).
86. E.g., Wasmund v. Nunamaker, 277 Minn. 52, 54-55, 151 N.W.2d 577, 579 (1967);
Thermorama, Inc. v. Shiller, 271 Minn. 79, 83-84, 135 N.W.2d 43, 46 (1965); see, e.g., In
re Giblin, 304 Minn. 510, 515-16, 232 N.W.2d 214, 218 (1975).
87. Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(2), 254 Minn. app. 77 (1959).

88. See id.
89. The writ of mandamus was reinstated in 1968. Compare Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(2),
278 Minn. app. 85 (1968) with Minn. R. Civ. P. 81.01(2), 254 Minn. app. 77 (1959).
90. MINN. STAT. § 484.03 (1976).
91. 264 Minn. 133, 146, 117 N.W.2d 746, 754 (1962).
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procedure that is affected by the amended rule and not the
relief.

This is so because, in the words of Rule 81.01(2), "the relief heretofore available thereby may be obtained by appropriate action
or appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these
rules." Furthermore, it should be noted that quo warranto is still
specified as a remedy available in the Minnesota Supreme
Court. 2
The writ is designed to correct the "usurpation, misuser, or
nonuser" of a public office. 3 Therefore, it is probably the proper
remedy to address matters such as the usurpation by one agency
of the powers of another,94 the penetration by an agency into an
area beyond its legitimate powers,95 and the constitutionality of
the statute delegating power to an administrative agency."
Perhaps the greatest area of difficulty in the application of the
writ is to determine the types of "misuser" which can be corrected
by the writ. The writ is not available to correct single acts of
agency misconduct or temporary acts in excess of agency jurisdiction. For example, in State ex rel. Grozbach v. Common School
District No. 65, the writ was sought to invalidate the assumption

of a school district's bond indebtedness by another school district.
The court held the writ was not available to challenge the bond
assumption because "the writ of quo warranto is not allowable as
preventative of, or remedy for, 'official misconduct and can not
be employed to test the legality of the official action of public
92. See, e.g., Latola v. Turk,
MINN. STAT.

-

Minn.

-,

247 N.W.2d 598 (1976) (per curiam);

§ 480.04 (1976).

93. E.g., State ex rel. Danielson v. Village of Mound, 234 Minn. 531, 542, 48 N.W.2d
855, 863 (1951); Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, supra note 1, 37 MINN. L. REv. at 3.
94. See, e.g., State ex rel. Village of Fridley v. City of Columbia Heights, 237 Minn.
124, 53 N.W.2d 831 (1952) (quo warranto used to preclude one municipality from annexing
and exercising jurisdiction over land in another municipality); State ex rel. Childs v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 66 Minn. 519, 69 N.W. 925 (1897) (quo warranto used to
challenge acquisition by organized county of territory located in an unorganized county),
aff'd on second appeal, 66 Minn. 519, 73 N.W. 631 (1898).
95. See cases cited in note 94 supra; cf. State ex rel. Clapp v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co.,
39 Minn. 538, 41 N.W. 108 (1888) (quo warranto may be used to determine whether a
foreign corporation has the power to do business in Minnesota).
96. See State ex rel. Goodwin v. Flahavin, 289 Minn. 149, 153, 182 N.W.2d 182, 184
(1971) (per curiam) (dictum) ("quo warranto is a proper proceeding to determine whether
a branch of the legislature has been organized according to the Constitution"); State ex
rel. Olsen v. Board of Control of State Institutions, 85 Minn. 165, 88 N.W. 533 (1902) (writ
of quo warranto sought to invalidate statutory delegation of control to one school board
on the ground that such delegation usurped the powers of another school board).
97. 237 Minn. 150, 54 N.W.2d 130 (1952).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 1
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

corporate officers.' ""s However, if the agency permanently or continuously engages in misconduct or other actions beyond its jurisdiction, the writ of quo warranto probably is an available rem99
edy.
In the final analysis, questions concerning the use of quo warranto are probably of minimal significance, since the abolition of
the writ as a procedure has, as a practical matter, caused its
disappearance as a means of obtaining judicial review of administrative action. The same objectives undoubtedly can be accomplished better through the use of declaratory judgment, injunction, or both. Because its most likely use would occur in precisely
those cases which involve the problem of determining the type of
"imisuser" to which the writ will apply, it seems the wisest course
for any practitioner is to steer clear of the whole problem and use
the other, more flexible remedies. For this reason, the former
touchy questions concerning the necessity of joining the attorney
general in any quo warranto proceeding need not be considered
in this Article. 00
98. Id. at 160, 54 N.W.2d at 136 (quoting State ex rel. Lommen v. Gravlin, 209 Minn.

136, 137, 295 N.W. 654, 655 (1941) and J.

HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES

§ 618, at

485 (2d ed. 1884)).
99. See, e.g., State ex rel. Harrier v. Village of Spring Lake Park, 245 Minn. 302, 71
N.W.2d 812 (1955) (quo warranto used to challenge an annexation); State v. Minnesota
Thresher Mfg. Co., 40 Minn. 213, 226, 41 N.W. 1020, 1025 (1889). In State ex rel. Childs
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 66 Minn. 519, 69 N.W. 925 (1896) the Minnesota court held
that quo warranto applied to challenge acts which would have been in excess of jurisdiction permanently or continuously. The court said:
True, the authorities all lay it down generally that quo warranto will not lie
to prevent official acts in excess of jurisdiction, or to correct official misconduct.
But, where a municipal corporation has permanently and continuously exercised jurisdiction over territory beyond its de jure limits, the case is not at all
analogous to one of mere official misconduct, which is usually of a casual or
temporary character, and to correct which quo warranto will not lie.
Id. at 530, 69 N.W. at 926.
100. Usually a private relator does not have standing to institute quo warranto proceedings unless he can demonstrate a special interest in challenging the legality of the administrative action. See Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, supra note 1, 37 MINN. L. REv. at 1015; cf. State ex rel. Burk v. Thuet, 230 Minn. 365, 41 N.W.2d 585 (1950) (private citizens
generally have no right to use quo warranto to challenge the title of a public official). The
court is more inclined to allow a private action, however, if the attorney general has at
least consented to the action. See, e.g., State ex rel. Danielson v. Village of Mound, 234
Minn. 531, 538, 48 N.W.2d 855, 861 (1951); State ex rel. Arpagaus v. Todd, 225 Minn. 91,
92, 29 N.W.2d 810, 810 (1947). See generally Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, supra at 815.
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V.

THE EQUITABLE REMEDIES

A.

Injunction

Except for the statutory remedy of declaratory judgment, injunctive relief is the most flexible of all remedies for agency error
because it has a broad range of applicability. It has been used,
usually in conjunction with declaratory judgment, to supplant
quo warranto and, during its temporary eclipse, mandamus. 01 As
the classic equitable remedy, the use of injunction is hedged by
the precedent conditions of irreparable damage and no other adequate remedy,0 2 and therefore is applied in the face of other remedies which may themselves be subject to the same limitation.
Mandamus, for example, like injunction, is available only if there
are no other adequate legal remedies; 10 3 yet the Minnesota court,
in Binder v. Village of Golden Valley, 04
1 denied the issuance of an
injunction based in part on the availability of mandamus as an
alternative remedy." 5 Because the extraordinary remedies are
legal in nature, it is probably the rule that an injunction will not
be issued unless the narrower, extraordinary legal remedies are
not available.
The requirements of no adequate legal remedies and irreparable harm also make injunction particularly inappropriate when
rulemaking is challenged. Generally, an injunction against legislative proceedings will not be issued; the rationale is that the
person affected by the legislative action is not irreparably harmed
from mere enactment and will have adequate remedies when the
law is enforced or its impact felt. 06
Similarly, the requirement of irreparable damage has particular importance in administrative cases as a factor used in determining ripeness for judicial review or the necessity of exhausting
administrative remedies. The court is not likely to entertain a
suit for an injunction against threatened administrative action,
particularly in cases of adjudication, unless irreparable injury
101. See Baird, supra note 1, at 452-53.
102. See, e.g., North Central Pub. Serv. Co. v. Village of Circle Pines, 302 Minn. 53,
59-60, 224 N.W.2d 741, 745-46 (1974); Borom v. City of St. Paul, 289 Minn. 371, 376, 184
N.W.2d 595, 598 (1971); Williams v. Rolfe, 257 Minn. 237, 239-41, 101 N.W.2d 923, 92526 (1960).
103. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
104. 260 Minn. 418, 110 N.W.2d 306 (1961).
105. See id. at 422-23, 110 N.W.2d at 309.
106. See, e.g., Binder v. Village of Golden Valley, 260 Minn. 418, 110 N.W.2d 306
(1961); Heller v. Schroeder, 182 Minn. 353, 234 N.W. 461 (1931).
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clearly and substantially appears. Thus, in Garavalia v. City of
Stillwater'07 the court took the position:108
The rule has long been settled in this state that no one is
entitled to injunctive protection against the actual or threatened acts of an administrative agency until the prescribed statutory remedy has been exhausted, unless the party seeking injunctive protection can show that the pursuit and exhaustion of
such administrative remedy will cause imminent and irreparable harm as distinguished from merely speculative damages
based on nothing more than an apprehension that the final outcome of the administrative proceedings will be prejudicial.
Moreover, the court clearly stated that where administrative action has not reached the stage of irreparable injury, the remedy
of injunction is not available even in the face of a charge that the
threatened action is in fact unconstitutional."'
The flexibility of injunction as a remedy lies in the fact that
its application is not conditioned by the nature of the administrative action as is the case with mandamus, certiorari, and quo
warranto. Thus injunction is applicable to a broader range of
administrative actions than the extraordinary remedies." 0 Furthermore, it seems that injunctive relief is open to a potentially
larger group of litigants than some of the other remedies, notably
certiorari and mandamus, which by their very nature provide an
avenue of relief to a limited group of litigants. Injunctive relief is
available to any person irreparably injured,"' and the modern
trend of the courts to broaden the scope of the requisites for
standing' has implications for the expanded use of injunctive
relief.
B.

DeclaratoryJudgment

The remedy of declaratory judgment is unique in this discussion because it is part of the general structure of remedies under
107. 283 Minn. 335, 168 N.W.2d 336 (1969).
108. Id. at 347, 168 N.W.2d at 345.
109. See id.
110. Baird, supra note 1, at 469-70.
111. See, e.g., Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 298 Minn. 306,
314-18, 215 N.W.2d 814, 821-24 (1974); Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1, 60 N.W.2d 18
(1953), writ of prohibitionquashed sub nor. Ramberg v. District Court, 241 Minn. 194,
62 N.W.2d 809 (1954), rev'd on third appeal on other grounds, 245 Minn. 474, 73 N.W.2d
195 (1955).
112. See notes 6-19 supra and accompanying text.
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Minnesota Statutes chapter 555113 and also is part of the specific
statutory method of review provided by MAPA."4 The ensuing
discussion refers to declaratory judgment as a general remedy
under chapter 555. Use of the declaratory judgment under MAPA
5
is discussed elsewhere in this Article."
Declaratory judgment is, as inspection of its statutory scope
reveals, a remedy of great breadth and flexibility."' Its form and
nature do not inhibit its application to narrow sets of facts like
the more specialized extraordinary writs, and its express application to situations involving "uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights""' makes it more generally applicable to threatened situations than the extraordinary writs with their "last resort" atmosphere. For this same reason, courts may be less constrained in declaratory judgment actions to apply strict rules of
ripeness for review or exhaustion of remedies.
The limit of the declaratory judgment action is bounded in the
first direction by the constitutional requirement of a justiciable
controversy."' The question of the presence of a justiciable controversy can be determined by reference to two sources: parties
and subject matter."' Thus, for example, no justiciable controversy may exist if the parties are in fact alter egos'20 or, on the
113. For a general discussion of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act appearing in
chapter 555, see Borchard, The Uniform DeclaratoryJudgments Act, 18 MINN. L. REv.
239 (1934).
114. See MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1976).
115. See notes 145-62 supra and accompanying text.
116. The Minnesota Legislature has declared that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act "is ... to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty
and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be liberally
construed and administered." MINN. STAT. § 555.12 (1976).
117. Id.
118. E.g., Minnesota Ass'n of Pub. Schools v. Hanson, 287 Minn. 415, 418-20, 178
N.W.2d 846, 850-51 (1970) (nonprofit organization, the purpose of which was to aid school
boards, lacked standing to challenge legislation affecting school boards because its interest
was no greater than that of any other member of the public); Beatty v. Winona Hous. &
Redev. Auth., 277 Minn. 76, 82-86, 151 N.W.2d 584, 588-90 (1967) (no standing to challenge agency action when such action was still in planning stage); Arens v. Village of
Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 390-93, 61 N.W.2d 508, 513 (1953) (taxpayer had standing to
challenge statute authorizing municipal liquor stores when such stores spent public
funds), appeal dismissed per curiam, 347 U.S. 949 (1954).
119. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. American Optical Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (D.
Minn. 1971) ("the facts [must] reveal the existence of an actual controversy between
parties having opposing legal interests of such immediacy that a declaration of rights is
warranted").
120. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 374 F. Supp. 1037, 1038 n.1 (E.D. Ark. 1974),
aff'd, 509 F.2d 872 (8th Cir. 1975); Clinton Coop. Farmers Elev. Ass'n v. Farmers Union
Grain Terminal Ass'n, 223 Minn. 253, 258-60, 26 N.W.2d 117, 121 (1947). In Clinton the
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other hand, if the surrounding fact situation has not yet developed a threat of cognizable size. 2 ' Generally, the courts have been
willing to entertain actions for declaratory judgment if the suitor
has been "injured in fact."' 22
As a general rule, declaratory judgment is available as a remedy even in cases where there is another adequate remedy by way
of statute or extraordinary writ.'23 There is nothing in the declaratory judgment statute itself which implies that it is an exclusive
remedy.'24 One exception to this general rule arises in situations
where judicial review is governed by special statute and the remedies set forth in the statute are exclusive. This situation arose in
Town of Stillwater v. Minnesota Municipal Commission."5 In
that case the Minnesota Municipal Commission was considering
the proposed annexation of two tracts of land to the City of Stillwater. Before final action on the proposal, the Township of Stillwater brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to quash the
proceedings on the ground that the commission would exceed its
powers if it ordered the annexation. Judicial review of the commission's orders was governed by a specific statute, Minnesota
Statutes section 414.07. The commission took the position that
the provisions in the statute governing appeal were exclusive,
Minnesota court distinguished collusive cases from "friendly" test cases, holding that the
latter did present a justiciable controversy. The court said:
A clean-cut issue was presented. . . . Tested by the manner and skill in which
this case was presented to the court, there is nothing here to meet the legal
requirements of collusion. The fact that an action is amicable does not make it
collusive.
Id. at 259, 26 N.W.2d at 121.
121. See, e.g., Beatty v. Winona Hous. & Redev. Auth., 277 Minn. 76, 82-86, 151
N.W.2d 584, 588-90 (1967) (no justiciable controversy where challenged agency action is
still in planning stage); Seiz v. Citizens Pure Ice Co., 207 Minn. 277, 290 N.W. 802 (1940)
(no justiciable controversy when employee challenging section of unemployment compensation act was not unemployed but merely had expectation of unemployment).
122. E.g., Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. Minnesota State Bd. of Pharmacy, 301 Minn.
28, 32, 221 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1974) (absent discernible legislative intent to the contrary,
the test of standing is injury in fact). For a discussion of the requirements of standing and
injury in fact, see notes 6-19 supra and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Conner v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 208-09, 81 N.W.2d
789, 793-94 (1957) (declaratory judgment available even though certiorari also might have
been available); Barron v. City of Minneapolis, 212 Minn. 566, 569, 4 N.W.2d 622, 624
(1942) (dictum). See generally Breese, Atrocities of DeclaratoryJudgments Law, 31 MNN.
L. REv. 575, 575-90 (1947) (discussing decisions which, perhaps erroneously, have failed
to view the declaratory judgment as an alternative remedy).
124. Moreover, MINN. R. Cwy. P. 57, which applies to declaratory judgments under
chapter 555 of Minnesota Statutes, provides: "The existence of another adequate remedy
does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate."
125. 300 Minn. 211, 219 N.W.2d 82 (1974).
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thus barring declaratory judgment as an alternative remedy. The
supreme court agreed with the commission, stating:" 6
To allow a declaratory judgment action challenging annexation proceedings requiring commission approval would in effect
allow a de novo consideration of the proceedings by the court
and would frustrate the clear intent of the legislature and would
create havoc with the commission's power to carry out its statutory duty.
The precedential value of Stillwater might be questioned because the court may have felt that the plaintiffs were premature
in their assault on the administrative process, which clearly was
not completed at the time of suit.' However, in an earlier case,
Land O'Lakes Dairy Co. v. Village of Sebeka, 21 the Minnesota
Supreme Court unambiguously rejected declaratory judgment as
a means of review where there is an exclusive, special statutory
provision for judicial review.12 1 In Land O'Lakes Dairy a taxpayer
had attempted to avoid real estate and personal property taxes
by having the property declared exempt from taxation on the
grounds that it technically was owned by the United States. The
court stated that the special statute for defense or objection to
taxes provides a taxpayer with a remedy which was intended to
be "adequate, speedy, and simple."' . Thus, the court held the
declaratory judgment action was precluded. 3 '
The Stillwater and Land O'Lakes Dairy cases should stand as
a timely reminder that the declaratory judgment remedy as well
as the extraordinary remedies are considered by the courts as
more or less drastic methods of review and may therefore fail in
light of a specific statutory remedy, even though the statutory
remedy appears to be an alternative form of relief. Courts here
seem to operate on some perceived concept of orderly administration of justice, somewhat parallel to the concept of primary juris126. Id. at 217, 219 N.W.2d at 86.
127. See id. at 212, 219 N.W.2d at 84 (action commenced "[blefore the commission
had completed hearings and issued all final orders").
128. 225 Minn. 540, 31 N.W.2d 660, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948).
129. See 225 Minn. at 544-49, 31 N.W.2d at 662-65. However, unlike the remedy for real
property tax grievances, the court held that the statutory remedy then available to contest
personal property taxes was inadequate because those taxes must be paid before relief is
available; thus, declaratory judgment was an alternative remedy to contest the personal
property taxes. Id. at 549, 31 N.W.2d at 665.
130. Id. at 548, 31 N.W.2d at 665.
131. Id.
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diction, 31 where the court will refuse to move in a proceeding
where there is an extensive legislative scheme encompassing the
3
agency.13
VI.

THE STATUTORY REMEDIES

The statutory provisions for judicial oversight of administrative
action divide themselves into two parts. The first part embraces
a number of special review statutes expressly applying to particular agencies. The second part is provided by MAPA.
A.

Special Review Statutes for ParticularAgencies

At the last count, there were more than 250 agencies in Minnesota at the state level alone. 31 4 Many agencies, at least prior to
enactment of MAPA, had special review procedures set forth in
their enabling statutes. Since passage of MAPA, and especially
in recent years, some of the statutes providing for these procedures have been repealed.' As a result, the special statutes are
not as pervasive as they were at an earlier time.
It would be unwise to do more with the special statutes than
to make a few general remarks about them and then to leave the
reader to a study in depth of the particular statutes governing the
agency involved because subtle differences abound. In general,
the statutes provide for appeal to the district court by persons
affected or aggrieved. 136 Moreover, they generally involve the re132. For a discussion of primary jurisdiction, see notes 45-48 supra and accompanying
text.
133. In Town of Stillwater v. Minnesota Mun. Comm'n, 300 Minn. 211, 219 N.W.2d 82
(1974) the court said:
In establishing the intricate substantive and procedural standards for annexation, consolidation, incorporation, and detachment, embodied in [the statute
governing the agency] . . . . and by creating the commission to administer
these complex matters, it is clear that the legislature intended the commission
to have virtually exclusive jurisdiction in determining the boundary changes of
political subdivisions by annexation.
Id. at 217, 219 N.W.2d at 86 (emphasis added).
134. MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF STATE, THE MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANuAL 1977-1978,
at 272 (1977).
135. See, e.g., Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 162, § 8, 1977 Minn. Laws 276 (repealing MINN.
STAT. § 105.47 (1976), which provided for judicial review of decisions by the Commissioner
of Natural Resources); Act of Apr. 9, 1976, ch. 223, § 41, 1976 Minn. Laws 748 (repealing
special review provisions for the State Board of Medical Examiners under MINN. STAT. §
147.13 (1974)); Act of Mar. 25, 1976, ch. 76, §§ 2, 8, 1976 Minn. Laws 194, 197 (amending
MINN. STAT. § 115.05 (1974) to provide for judicial review of the Minnesota PCA in
accordance with MAPA).
136. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 216.24-.25 (1976 & Supp. 1977) (Minnesota Public Service Commission); id. § 414.07 (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 705, § 31,
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view of formal proceedings and the record.
For example, the rather terse provisions for review of the Minnesota Municipal Board set forth these broad grounds for appeal: 37
(a) That the board had no jurisdiction to act;
(b) That the board exceeded its jurisdiction;
(c) That the order of the board is arbitrary, fraudulent, capricious or oppressive or in unreasonable disregard of the best interests of the territory affected;
(d) That the order is based upon an erroneous theory of law.
for partial or perhaps complete
Some appeal statutes also provide 38
court.
district
the
in
novo
de
trial
B.

The Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act

The second part of the statutory scheme is found in the provisions of MAPA, particularly sections 15.0411 through 15.0426 of
Minnesota Statutes. 3 ' This Article will examine three general
aspects of these MAPA provisions: the agencies to which MAPA
applies, judicial review of rulemaking, and judicial review of adjudication.
1.

The Agencies Encompassed by MAPA

MAPA is by no means a comprehensive system of judicial review because it applies only to "any state officer, board, commission, bureau, division, department, or tribunal, other than a
court, having a statewide jurisdiction and authorized by law to
make rules or to adjudicate contested cases.""10 There then follows a list of expressly exempt statewide agencies."' Obviously,
1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 533 (West) (Minnesota Municipal Board).
137. MINN. STAT. § 414.07(2) (1976).
138. See, e.g., id. § 116A.19(3) (additional evidence permitted in appeal from county
board's order dismissing petition for any waste or sewer system or establishing or refusing
to establish any water or sewer system). One limitation, however, is that a court cannot
have a de novo trial on issues which are nonjudicial in nature. For example, the court in
State ex rel. McGinnis v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 253 Minn. 62, 65-71, 91 N.W.2d 154,
157-60 (1958) held that it would not give effect to a statute which provided for trial de
novo on the administrative decision of a municipality to discharge one of its employees.
Because the municipality's decision was clearly administrative and nonjudicial, the supreme court stated that review could be by certiorari only.
139. MINN. STAT. §§ 15.0411-.0426 (1976 & Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28,
1978, ch. 674, §§ 2-3, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 431 (West) (revisor's bill).
140. MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(2) (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch.
674, § 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 431 (West) (emphasis added).
141. The MAPA provisions do not apply to:
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local agencies not having statewide jurisdiction are also exempt.
This is not the place to enter upon a conjecture whether there are
agencies of doubtful scope of jurisdiction or whether adjudication
and rulemaking "authorized by law" encompasses actions done
under authorization implied from the terms of the statute which
created the agency as well as actions which are expressly authorized by the empowering statute.
2.

Review of Rulemaking

The review plan provides for separate treatment for the two
types of administrative action, rulemaking and adjudication."' It
is assumed that these two categories are mutually exclusive, but
whether between them they exhaust the entire category of appealable administrative action is an open question.
The term "rule" is carefully defined in traditional terms 3 but
contains further express exceptions from the operation of
MAPA.4 Review of rules takes place under MAPA by a declaratory judgment action in accordance with section 15.0416 of Min(a) agencies directly in the legislative or judicial branches, (b) emergency powers in sections 12.31 to 12.37, (c) corrections board and pardon board, (d) the
unemployment insurance program in the department of economic security, (e)
the director of mediation services, (f) the workers compensation division in the
department of labor and industry, (g) the workers compensation court of appeals, (h) board of pardons, or (i) the department of military affairs.
MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(2) (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 674, § 2,
1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 431 (West) (revisor's bill). In addition, the Minnesota Municipal Board is excepted from the provisions relating to review of contested cases. MINN.
STAT. § 15.0411(2) (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 674, § 2, 1978
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 431 (West) (revisor's bill).
142. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 15.0416-.0417 (1976 & Supp. 1977) (review of rules) with
id. §§ 15.0424-.0426 (review of contested cases).
143. The term "rule" includes "every agency statement of general applicability and
future effect, including the amendment, suspension, or repeal thereof, made to implement
or make specific the law enforced or administered by it or to govern its organization or
procedure .
I...
Id. § 15.0411(3) (1976).
144. The express exceptions from the definition of "rule" are: (1) internal agency rules
which do not directly affect the public, (2) rules of the commissioner of corrections relating
to the internal management of prisons, (3) rules of the division of game and fish, (4) rules
relating to weight limitations on highways indicated by signs, and (5) opinions of the
attorney general. Id.
In addition, mere statements of agency policy are not "rules" if they are not intended
to have the force and effect of law. See Steere v. State, Minn. -,
, 243 N.W.2d
112, 116 (1976); Wacha v. Kandiyohi County Welfare Bd., Minn. -, 242
N.W.2d 837, 839 (1976) (per curiam). However, a statement of agency policy will be
deemed a "rule" if it involves "a question of social and political policy so important to
the public as a whole as to require that the rulemaking process of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act be followed." McKee v. Likins, Minn.
261 N.W.2d
566, 577-78 (1977) (per curiam).
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nesota Statutes, which states: "The validity of any rule may be
determined upon the petition for a declaratory judgment thereon
... ,," Although some question may be raised whether the
statute applies only to declaratory judgment relief under Minnesota Statutes chapter 555, "1 it is reasonable to assume that it does
and therefore does not call forth a new or different remedy.
A declaratory judgment may be sought by any person whose
legal rights or privileges are threatened or impaired by the rule.147
In addition, a declaratory judgment may be sought even though
the agency has not been requested to judge the validity of the
8
rule.1
Under the provisions of section 15.0417, relief may be granted
if the rule (1) violates constitutional provisions, (2) exceeds statutory authority of the agency, or (3) was adopted without compliance with statutory rulemaking procedures. 14 Time will tell
whether this rather stark enumeration of grounds for relief contains any hurtful omissions; yet it seems likely that if the courts
apply the declaratory judgment remedy in accordance with the
broad principles of flexibility which underlie it, the categories will
prove to be adequate. Category (1) is certainly comprehensive
enough to cover the situation where a rule is adopted without due
process by methods which are capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable. 150 Category (2) should encompass both the situation
where an agency trenches beyond its granted powers, such as
extending its jurisdiction by an unwarranted agency interpretation of its enabling statute,'' and the less likely situation (under
modern interpretations of the law) where there is a faulty delegation of power by the legislature." 2 These two categories therefore
145. MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1976).
146. See notes 113-33 supra and accompanying text. See also note 61 supra.
147. MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1976).
148. Id.
149. Id. § 15.0417.
150. See, e.g., Monk & Excelsior, Inc. v. Minnesota State Bd.of Health, 302 Minn. 502,
509-10, 225 N.W.2d 821, 825 (1975) (arbitrary and capricious promulgation of rules in
violation of MAPA is violative of due process).
256
Minn.
151. See Francis v. Minnesota Bd. of Barber Examiners, N.W.2d 521, 525 (1977) (no authority to adopt a rule requiring proof of public necessity
246 N.W.2d
Minn. to obtain a barber school license); Guerrero v. Wagner, 838, 841 (1976) (no authority to promulgate a rule delegating a duty which, by statute, is
assigned to someone else).
152. The Minnesota Supreme Court has allowed liberal delegation of power to administrative agencies. Although statutory standards have been required traditionally for valid
delegation, see, e.g., Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 112-15, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538-39 (1949),
the court more recently has held that specific standards are unnecessary when complex
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seem to cover matters of substance, and the remaining category
(3) simply confirms the obvious by reaching matters of procedure.
Section 15.0417 provides rather cryptically that "the court
shall declare the rule invalid" if it finds that the agency has
violated any of the substantive or procedural requirements. From
this language it may be inferred that the court has only an alternative to either affirm or invalidate. A recent case demonstrates
the power of the reviewing court with respect to disposition after
review of the rulemaking process.
In Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency'53 there was an appeal from rules made by the Pollution
Control Agency under specific provisions of Minnesota Statutes
section 115.05, which provided that the reviewing court may validate the rule or, if the rule is found invalid, the court may remand
the case to the agency for further proceedings. After hearing additional evidence, the district court found the rule invalid as applied to Reserve Mining Company."' Rather than remanding the
case to the agency, however, the district court took further action
itself by compelling negotiations between the agency and Reserve
Mining Company.' The supreme court held that the district
court had authority to remand only,'5 even though under section
115.05(7) the reviewing district court was clearly authorized to
develop additional evidence in reviewing the validity of the
rule. "7 Thus, even if the court could itself generate the additional
evidence necessary to shape an invalid rule into a valid rule, the
court may not legally do so and must remand the case if the rule
is found invalid.
Reserve Mining involved the application of a special review
statute, Minnesota Statutes section 115.05. Although this statute
has since been amended to provide for judicial review in accordance with MAPA,'5 the principle derived from Reserve Mining
regarding the proper use of evidence generated in the reviewing
court under section 115.05 is also relevant to review under MAPA.
Section 15.0416 of MAPA provides for review by declaratory judgand varied subject matter renders such standards impracticable. See, e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Krebes, 303 Minn. 219, 223-24, 226 N.W.2d 617, 620-21 (1975); Anderson v.
Commissioner of Highways, 267 Minn. 308, 311-12, 126 N.W.2d 778, 780-81 (1964).
153. 294 Minn. 300, 200 N.W.2d 142 (1972).
154. Id. at 308, 200 N.W.2d at 146-47.
155. Id. at 309, 200 N.W.2d at 147.
156. Id. at 306-09, 200 N.W.2d at 145-47.
157. Id. at 306-07, 200 N.W.2d at 146 (quoting section 115.05(7)).
158. See Act of Mar. 25, 1976, ch. 76, §§ 2, 8, 1976 Minn. Laws 194, 197.
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ment, 55 which arguably encompasses a de novo proceeding and
60
the introduction of additional evidence.1
After the district court proceeding, any party to the proceeding,
including the agency, may appeal an adverse decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court."'1 Presumably this appeal is governed by
1 2
the rules applicable to civil appeals.
3.

Review of Adjudication

The second half of MAPA's review scheme covers review of
decisions in contested cases.1 3 "Contested case" is defined in part
as "a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing.""' It is
substantially similar to the definition set forth in the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, which adds ratemaking, licensing,
and price fixing.6 5 The Minnesota definition encompasses situations where the requirements of due process or other legal principles implicitly dictate an "agency hearing"' 6 as well as situations
where an agency hearing is expressly dictated by statute. 7
159.

MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1976).
160. See Kudak, supra note 61, at 163; note 62 supra.
161. MINN. STAT. § 15.0417 (Supp. 1977).
162. See id. § 555.07 (1976) (supreme court review of declaratory judgments under
chapter 555 proceeds as other appeals); cf. id. § 15.0426 (Supp. 1977) (appeals to supreme
court in agency adjudication, as distinguished from rulemaking, proceed like other civil
appeals).
163. Id. §§ 15.0424-.0426 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
164. Id. § 15.0411(4) (1976). However, hearings by the Department of Corrections involving inmate discipline, transfers, or management are specifically excluded from the
definition of contested case. See id.
165. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEDuRE AcT § 1(2) (1961) defines contested case
as "a proceeding, including but not restricted to ratemaking, [price fixing], and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be
determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing ....
166. See, e.g., State ex ret. Independent School Dist. No. 276 v. Department of Educ.,
Minn. 256 N.W.2d 619, 624-25 (1977); Setty v. Minnesota State College
Bd., 305 Minn. 495, 498-500, 235 N.W.2d 594, 596-97 (1975). See also Minnesota Pub.
Interest Research Group v. Minnesota Environmental Quality Council, 306 Minn. 370,
381, 237 N.W.2d 375, 382 (1975) (court declined to determine whether, in context of a
"contested case," a hearing was required under the due process clause because there was
a statute which required a hearing).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held consistently that agency disputes with other
governmental entities are not contested cases because, in the absence of statute, a governmental entity is not entitled under the due process clause to a hearing. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Independent School Dist. No. 276 v. Department of Educ., Minn. -,
-,
256
N.W.2d 619, 623-25 (1977); Independent School Dist. No. 581 v. Mattheis, 275 Minn. 383,
386-88, 147 N.W.2d 374, 376-78 (1966).
167. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Minnesota Environmental
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The provisions for review set forth in section 15.0424 of Minnesota Statutes are long and complex and should therefore be read
with some care. One important provision is that some agencies
which are excepted from the general provisions of MAPA are
included in the specific MAPA provisions for judicial review of
contested cases. Judicial review of contested cases, under MAPA
section 15.0424(1), includes cases coming from 6 '
any agency as defined in section 15.0411, subdivision 2 (including those agencies excluded from the definition of "agency" in
section 15.0411, subdivision 2, but excepting the tax court of
appeals, the workers compensation court of appeals sitting on
workers compensation cases, the department of employment
services, the director of mediation services, and the department
of public services) ....
Thus, included within the review procedures for contested cases
are the following which would otherwise be exempt from the
MAPA definition of "agency": agencies directly in the legislative
or judicial branches, acts of emergency powers exercised pursuant
to Minnesota Statutes sections 12.31 through 12.37, the Corrections Board, the unemployment insurance program in the Department of Economic Security, the Worker's Compensation Division in the Department of Labor and Industry, the Board of
Pardons, and the Department of Military Affairs.'
The appeal may be taken whether the agency decision is affirmative or negative in form. 170 With two exceptions,' the petiQuality Council, 306 Minn. 370, 380-81, 237 N.W.2d 375, 381-82 (1975); Waters v. Putnam, 289 Minn. 165, 168-69, 183 N.W.2d 545, 548 (1971).
168. MmN. STAT. § 15.0424(1) (1976).
169. Compare id. with id. § 15.0411(2) (Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of Mar. 28,
1978, ch. 674, § 2, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 431 (West) (revisor's bill).
170. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0424(1) (1976).
171. These exceptions are as follows:
(1) In the case of a tentative or proposed decision which has become the
decision of the agency either by express approval or by a failure by an aggrieved
person to file exceptions within a prescribed time under the agency's rules, such
30-day period shall not begin to run until the latest of the following events shall
have occurred: (a) such decision shall have become the decision of the agency
as aforesaid; (b) such decision, either before or after it has become the decision
of the agency, shall have been served by mail by such agency on the parties of
record in such proceeding.
(2) In case a request for rehearing or reconsideration shall have been made
within the time permitted and in conformity with the agency's rules, such 30day period shall not begin to run until service of the order finally disposing of
the application for rehearing or reconsideration, but nothing herein shall be
construed as requiring that an application for rehearing or reconsideration be
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tion for review must be served upon the agency and filed in the
district court for the county where the agency has its principal
office or where the petitioners reside within thirty days after the
final agency decision has been mailed to the parties.'
Other parties in the contested case must be notified,' and each
has twenty days from the date of notification to answer in a
"notice of appearance" with an indication of his stance as to the
disposition on review."'7 The agency decision is not stayed during
the appeal.'
There is some question about the use of alternative remedies
as a means of obtaining review after the time has lapsed under
section 15.0424. Although the particular facts of the case may
have affected the result, this issue came before the court in
Waters v. Putnam,'75 where the plaintiffs elected to proceed to
review an order of the Water Resources Board by way of certiorari
and mandamus instead of section 15.0424. The appeal was taken
after the statutory time limit had passed, and the court indicated
that the statute limited the time for review on the theory that
"[tihe right to appeal having lapsed, appellants cannot now do
indirectly (by certiorari and mandamus) what they failed to do
directly by appeal."' 77 Because the facts in the case are peculiar,
however, the precedent should be treated with caution.'
The district court review proceeding is usually conducted under
the rules of civil procedure and is without a jury. "' The scope of
review provisions for contested cases is very complete. The reviewing court may reverse or modify the agency decision if the
"substantial" rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced
because the administrative decision was:8
filed with and disposed of by the agency as a prerequisite to the institution of a
review proceeding under this section.
Id. § 15.0424(2)(a).
172. Id.
173. The petitioner must notify the other parties within 30 days after the review proceeding is initiated. Id. § 15.0424(2)(b).
174. Id. § 15.0424(2)(c).
175. Id. § 15.0424(3).
176. 289 Minn. 165, 183 N.W.2d 545 (1971).
177. Id. at 172, 183 N.W.2d at 550.
178. See also Blixt v. Civil Serv. Bd., 297 Minn. 504, 504-05, 210 N.W.2d 230, 231 (1973)
(per curiam) (relying on Waters, the court held that failure to appeal within the time
provided by section 15.0424 deprives the district court of jurisdiction).
179. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424(6) (1976).
180. Id. § 15.0425.
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(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency; or
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire
record as submitted; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious.
Unlike the conventional remedy of certiorari which is confined to
matters in the record,' 8' the statutory provisions for review may
involve the introduction of facts outside the record. Minnesota
Statutes section 15.0424(5) provides for additional evidence if the
reviewing court feels that such evidence is "material" and that
it was excusably omitted at the agency hearing. 182 For this reason
it seems certain that the statutory remedy, where available, offers
a remedy preferable to the more narrow extraordinary remedies.
Of course, even the general statutory remedies might not be
preferable to special statutory remedies which may include trial
de novo. In this regard, MAPA is careful to preserve whatever
advantage may lie in other remedies: "[Nothing in this section
shall be deemed to prevent resort to other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law now or hereafter
enacted."" 3
After the district court review, an aggrieved party may appeal
to the supreme court in accordance with the rules governing civil
actions.' 8 At one time, the agency itself was not entitled to an
appeal under MAPA. The Minnesota Supreme Court has, on
several occasions, denied an agency's appeal because "[wihere
no statute provides otherwise, an agency which functions in a
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity is without right to appeal since,
in such a case, the agency is in no different position from a court
or judge which has rendered the decision."' In 1977, however,
181. See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
182. MINN. STAT. § 15.0424(5) (1976).
183. Id. § 15.0424(1); see In re West St. Paul State Bank, 302 Minn. 124, 126 n.1, 223
N.W.2d 793, 795 n.1 (1974); Bryan v. Community State Bank, 285 Minn. 226, 230, 172
N.W.2d 771, 774 (1969).
184. MINN. STAT. § 15.0426 (Supp. 1977).
185. The leading case in which this quote appears is In re Getsug, 290 Minn. 110, 114,
186 N.W.2d 686, 689 (1971) (citing, inter alia, Minnesota Water Resources Bd. v. County
of Traverse, 287 Minn. 130, 177 N.W.2d 44 (1970) and Town of Eagan v. Minnesota Mun.
Comm'n, 269 Minn. 239, 130 N.W.2d 525 (1964)).
The principle set forth in Getsug has been followed in subsequent Minnesota cases. See
Minnesota Dep't of Highways v. Minnesota Dep't of Human Rights, Minn. -,
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the Minnesota Legislature changed the effect of these cases by
amending MAPA to include the agency as a party entitled to an
appeal."'
VII.

CONCLUSION

Presently, many local agencies are not subject to MAPA or
other specific statutes. There would seem to be good reason for
legislative action which would impose standard methods of procedure for rulemaking and adjudication upon the administrative
structure at all levels. Although exceptions are necessary or desirable, it can be assumed that most of the exceptions already have
been written into the law at the state agency level now covered
by MAPA. Whether these exceptions reflect actual necessity or
in some instances political reality and ancient prerogatives is a
matter which, ideally, should be carefully considered in any thorough overhaul of the Act.
Further, there seems to be little reason not to apply, in like
manner, a general statute governing judicial review. The Minnesota Legislature could provide, under general statute, a single
form of review which would obviate resort to the various extraordinary remedies with their many potential pitfalls. It is conceivable that such a review action could be the present declaratory judgment and its attendant relief. This form of action is
certainly flexible enough to permit courts to tailor the relief to
the requirements of any particular situation under longstanding
judicial concepts, supplemented by legislative guidelines already
embodied in section 706 of the federal Administrative Procedures
Act.817
-,
241 N,W.2d 310, 313-14 (1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 863 (1976);
Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. Governor's Certificate of Need Appeal Bd., 304 Minn.
209, 213-14, 230 N.W.2d 176, 179 (1975).
186. See Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 443, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 1221 (codified as MiNN.
STAT. § 15.0426 (Supp. 1977)).
187. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
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Another great concern today is the matter of judicial control
over the wide discretion heretofore given to administrators and
confirmed by benign court treatment of administrative power. It
is certainly time that the legislature itself take the responsibility
for minimizing discretion as much as possible. It is also within the
scope of judicial power to do the same. One obvious way is to
leave legislative grants of administrative power undisturbed, but
by judicial action require administrative agencies to provide at
least procedural safeguards and, to the extent possible, statements of substantive policy. A tendency in this direction is perhaps discernible in the seeming ambivalence of the courts toward
de novo proceedings on appeal. The de novo device appears to be
particularly apt where the subject matter is not an adjudicative
decision on the record but is the more common form of a rule or
policy decision based upon no proper record as such. Courts can
aid in this quarter by requiring a statement of reasons for such
action and such a statement could by itself be one basis for judicial review. At any rate it does seem clear that the Minnesota
courts are aware of the general problem and that further case law
will show where the guidelines are.
It seems also to be the case that there will be a continuing
tendency for courts to permit people or groups access to the courts
under enlarged concepts of standing. The present attitudes
toward standing obviously arose in the recent historical period of
widespread demand by various activist groups for direct access to
the governmental decisionmaking process. However, questions
may now be raised about the overall desirability of permitting
numbers of groups and individuals unlimited access to courts if
their legitimate rights can otherwise be protected. Access to the
courts is a powerful weapon, but it should not be used to delay
or frustrate legitimate public undertakings. It should indeed be
proper to consider carefully what additions should be made to the
administrative-judicial process that would provide the proper
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;

(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject
to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record
or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the rule
of prejudicial error.
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balance between individual rights on the one side and public
objectives on the other. An indication of such a device, with very
probable application to other upcoming cases, is the recent proposal of Minnesota Governor Perpich for a "science court" to
determine complex technical issues concerning a 400-kilovolt
power transmission line.
It seems probable that the future holds for all of us severe
restrictions upon activities which for generations have been considered a citizen's natural right, particularly those activities and
amenities of life requiring high consumption of energy and materials. But mere restrictions, unpalatable as they must be, may be
rendered unbearable without a responsible and intelligent administration, which in turn must depend upon rational, orderly, and
understandable processes. In this area much has been done, but
more can be accomplished.
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